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• v.

ALBERTO-CULVER
COMPANY

-

for the N.D. Ill. (Lynch) alleging material misrepresentations
and omissions, in connection with

re~p's

purchase from petr of
'.

3 foreign business entities, in violation of§ lO(b) of the

-

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5, and common law

____.,

fraud, deceit and breach of expressed contractual warranties, petr

.

moved for a stay of the District Court proceedings pending arbi-

---------- - ----

tration of the dispute in accordance with the terms of the acquisition
'------
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- 2 contracts and instituted arbitration proceedings.

The

District Court, on the basis of Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427
~

(1953), denied the stay and enjoined petr from proceeding with

-----

arbitration.

CA 7 (Grant, D.J., Gordon, D.J.) affirmed, one

judge (Stevens) dissenting.
2.

FACTS:

Resp Alberto-Culver [A-C] manufactures and

sells cosmetics in domestic and international markas and is
centered in Illinois.

Petr Scherk is a German citizen r siding

in3witzerlaEd who formerly was engaged in the manufacture and
sale of cosmetics in western Europe through a sole proprietorship
manufacturing facility in Berlin [FLS] and a Liechtenstein holding
company [SEV] licensing the sale and distribution of resp's
cosmetics on an international basis under a variety of trademarks.
Petr also owned another German business entity [Lodeva] which was
and remains dormant.
Beginning in 1967, A-C commenced negotiations with Scherk

---

to acquire petr's 3 businesses.

-------

~

--

Agreement was reached in Illinois

....

in 1968 on the basic provisions of the acquisition agreement, the
agreements were ultimately signed, after further negotiations, in
Vienna in January 1969, and the closing was in June 1969 in Geneva.
The agreement provided that SEV, an entity which had no U.S. counter-

·-

--

part, would be converted to a stock corporation and A-C would acquire

-

100% of the stock.

- ~

~

It also provided that as to the acquisition of

SEV and FLS:
"The parties agree that if any controversy
or claim shall arise out of this agreement
or the breach thereof and e.ither party shall

1

•

• <•
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request that the matter be settled by
arbitration, the matter shall be settled
exclusively by arbitration in accordance
with the rules then obtaining of the
International Chamber of Commerce, Paris,
France • • • • All arbitration proceedings
shall be held in Paris, France, and each
party agrees to comply in all respects
with any award made in any such proceeding
and to the entry of a judgment in any
jurisdiction upon any award rendered .in
such proceeding. The law of the $tate of
Illinois U.S.A. shall apply to and govern
thLs agreement, its interpretation and
performance."
l
Nearly a year after the closing, A-C discovered that the trademark

as the CA put it.
:;.,~~g;reement

---

As a result, A-C sought to rescind the purchase

and offered the business back to Scherk 1 who refused to
.,

accept it.

'

Scherk started to institute arbitration in early 1971,

but did not file a request to arbitrate with the International
Chamber of Commerce [ICC] until November; in the interim in June,
resp brought the present suit based on securities and common law
fraud.

In addition to unsuccessfully moving for dismissal on

various grounds not in issue here, including failure to state a
cause of action under the Securities Exchange Act, petr moved for
a stay of the District Court action pending arbitration before the
ICC.

The District Court denied the motion and enjoined petr from

continuing with the arbitration proceedings; on interlocutory
appeal, the CA affirmed.
3.

THE CA DECISION:

Court's reliance on Wilko v.

The CA majority approved of the
~'

Distric ~

supra, where this Court held, in

a suit by a customer against a securities brokerage firm, that an

- 4 agreement to arbitrate a future controversy contained in margin
agreements was a "stipulation" waiving the right of a security buyer
to select a judicial forum for determination of claims which might
later arise under the Securities Act of 1933 and was, therefore,
void under§ 14 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77n, which renders void
'------.
"[a]ny condition, stipulation or provision binding any person ac-

------------ ------------

quiring any security to waive --------~------------------------compla!hce with [the Act or SEC rules] . ''
The Court noted in Wilko that two conflicting policies of Congress,
one favoring the use of arbitration and the other protecting the
rights of investors and forbidding waiver of those rights, were
involved, and decided "that the intention of Congress concerning the
sale of securities is better carried out by holding invalid such aD
agreement for arbitration of issues arising under the Act."
at 438.

346 U.S. ,

The CA majority rejected petr's attempt to distinguish

Wilko on the ground that a domestic transaction was involved there
··and the rule should be otherwise when dealing with international
transactions under the approach of M.S. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1, which held that a forum-selection clause contained
in a towing contract negotiated at arms-length by experienced
businessmen, providing for the litigation of any dispute in the
High Court of Justice in London, should be specifically enforced by
U.S. courts unless it could be shown that enforcement would be
unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for fraud
or overreaching.

..

Zapata did not involve the sale of securities and

was therefore not controlling .

- 5 -

Judge Stevens, in dissent, recognized that the relevant
~

statutory language in§ 29(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a)
(App., at 38), was substantially identical to that in§ 14 of the
1933 Act and it was therefore not easy to distinguish this case
from Wilko.

Nonetheless, he urged that§ 29(a) should permit

e~ceability

of certain

~ments

to arbitrate disputes which

involve a claimed violation of the 1934 Act, because enforcement in
some circumstances, including the present ones, would not be
contrary to the policy of the Act and, in such situations, the
stronger policy mandated by § 201 of the Federal Arbitration Act,

----------

-

9 U.S.C. § 201, which provides for the enforcement in U.S. courts of
the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign

--

Arbitral Awards, should override.

Stressing the recognition in

Zapata of the expansion of American business abroad in the last 20
years, and the broad coverage of the 1934 Act to situations where
the controversy is not between the sophisticated securities dealer
and the average much less informed investor, but where Rule lOb-S
is applied to "negotiated transactions in which the amount at stake
typically justifies an independent audit or other verification of the
property being purchased or sold, and the transfer of securities is
a function of the form in which the parties elect to cast their
transaction," J. Stevens thought there was correspondingly _____,
less

--

· justification for prohibiting waiver of the right to sue in t~e

-

--

district courts for securities violations.

In this case, the

dispute was covered by contract warranties and the trademark
deficiencies were subject to pre-closing verification by a sophisti,

cated American business concern so that including the "fraud"

- 6 language of lOb-S in the complaint is far less significant than
the desirability of having the ICC arbitrate the "questions of
foreign law" which should determine the parties' rights in accordance with the arbitration clause in the acquisition agreements.
4.

CONTENTIONS:
a.

Petr first contends that the CA ignored and

effectively nullified the policy of Congress as expressed in the
1970 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 201, et.

~·

Resp answers

that Wilko and § 29(a) of the 1934 Act invalidate agreements to
arbitrate future disputes under the 1934 Act, especially in situation s
as here, where the petr violated the Act within the United States.
Moreover, the 1958 Convention (attached as an appendix to the

( ,.
.

response) explicitly provides that a court of a contracting party
need not refer a dispute to arbitration if it finds the agreement
to arbitrate "null and void," Art. II ,f 3, and that enforcement of an
award may be refused if the arbitration agreement "is not valid under
the law to which the parties have subjected it," or the "recognition
or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy
of [the] country" asked to enforce or recognize the award.
b.

Petr next contends that the policy considerations

found controlling in Zapata apply with equal force to the issue o ~
L·~. ; l ' ~ I J
~
enforcing arbitation clauses in international cornrra:-ce.. to in arm's
length bargaining between sophisticated businessmen.

Resp considers

Za2ata inapplicable because it did not involve an alleged violation

C>

of a federal statute providing for exclusive jurisdiction in the
federal courts, as is provided for securities violations, and for

- 7 -

no waiver of rights under the Act as does§ 291a).

Moreover,

Zapata itself noted, 407 U.S., at 15, that a "contractual choiceof-forum clause should be held unenforceable if enforcement would
contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is
brought, whether declared by statute or judicial decision."
c.

Petr suggests Wilko should be reexamined in the

context of sophisticated businessmen of equal bargaining strength
operating in international commerce, along with the lines of
Judge Stevens' dissent.

Resp urges that Wilko controls and that

the Court recognized in Superindendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life
and Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10, that "the Act protects corporations
as well as individuals who are sellers of a security."
d.

Finally, petr invokes the specter of wide-ranging

detrimental effects on international commercial transactions in
which American businesses participate if, contrary to agreements to
arbitrate before international tribunals, they can avoid arbitration
and sue in the federal courts.

Resp replies that no such effects

will occur and all that is involved here is requiring foreigners who
do business in this country to comply with our securities laws.
5.

DISCUSSION:

The conflicting policies which the Court

in Wilko considered "not easily reconcilable" are perhaps even more
irreconcilable in this case where the 1934 Act is being applied to
an alleged fraud violation arising from the acquisition by one
sophisticated investor of the stock of another and where the element
of international commercial transactions is involved, with the
attendant policy considerations the Court recognized in Zapata.

In

.
- 8 short, there is much merit in Judge Stevens' dissent below.
Still, fraud is the central target of the securities laws, even
if common law actions are also available for remedy of the
fraudulent activities, and Wilko found the balance to be in favor
of application of the non-waiver provisions of the Acts.

There

is no indication that the Federal Arbitration Act's adoption of
the 1958 Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards was meant to express any greater policy in favor
of arbitration than the older ·provisions of the Federal Arbitration
Act nttfound so important in Wilko as to override the Securities
Act's non-waiver provisions.

Indeed, the provisions cited by resp

,... a.re wholly consistent with the Wilko approach.

:··~·~···

, .. ,

.t ·· ;

,'

t

.: ., • .

1_.~ ~·.--·:..'.r

· -..

t

"~· . ·:
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Thus, unless the

•

Court desires to consider difrerent ' rules applicable when the
securities violation is alleged to have occurred between businessmen
of equal bargaining strength

negotiatiqn~ in
.

.J

international commerce,

Wilko was correctly applied by the CA, and the petn should be
denied.
There is a response.
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JU ST ICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

Apr il 2 9 , 19 7 4

Re:

No. 73-781 - Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.

Dear Chief:
I now cast a tentative vote to reverse in this case
on the following admittedly sketchy basis:
(1) Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434-435
states that the "right to select a judicial
forum is the kind of •provision• that cannot
be waived under section 14 of the Securities
Act."
(2) The Convention on the Recognition and

Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, enacted
after the Securities Act, since it has the
status of a treaty, superseding that Act if
there is a ~o~f lict, reserves possible "public
policy" defenses to the enforcem(-"nt stage of
the arbitration proceeding, rather than permitting them to be raised in the original action
to compel arbitration. See Article V(2).
I do
not believe the language of Article II(3)
-Speaking of ag-reements that are "null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed"
is dealing with the sort of public policy defense
that Wilko v. Swan allowed.

- 2 -

(3) If the parties can therefore be required
to submit the claim to arbitration, the Convention
obviates the only claim that Wilko preserved to
the unwilling party:
the right to insist that
the judicial forum be chosen. Any other public
policy defenses going to the merits of the
~rbitration award would be preserved to the
enforc ement stage • .
Sincerely,

PvV

.. r 1
/1! v

The ·Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

2nd DRAFT

: The Chief Juotico
Mr·. Justice Dnut;las
Mr. Just:tce j~rP.Plan
Mr. JusUce "1/hiic
Mr · Ju.st:i.ce i' ~·. :c.:::hal l
tr. Just5 ce ., L:.ckmun
-........,.~r · .Tl.:r;tico Jh~ ·el l
Mr · Justice Rslmquis t
From: ul:.e\lal't, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Circulated:--.- ...,...:__'>...........ll---+-19j4.7...:::J4:___

No. 73-781
Fr.itz Schcrk, Petitioner,
. v. C
Alb erto· C u1ver ompany.

Recirculated:

j OnUnited
Writ of Certiorari . to the
States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh

c·lrCUl't •

[June -, 1974]

MR.

JusTICE STEWART

delivered the opinion of the

Court
Alberto-Culver Co., the- respondent, is an American
company incorporated in Delaware with its principal
office in Illinois. It manufactures and distributes toiletries and hair products in this country and abroad. During the 1960's Alberto-Culver decided to expand its
overseas operations, and as part of this program it
approached the petitioner Fritz Scherk, a German citizen
residing at the time of trial in Switzerland. Scherk was
the owner of three interrelated business entities, organized under the laws of Germany and Liechtenstein, that
were engaged in the manufacture of toiletries and the
licensing of trademarks for such toiletries. An initial
contact with Scherk was made by a representative of
Alberto-Culver in Germany in June, 1967, and negotiatiolls followed at further meetings in both Europe and
the United States during 1967 and 1968. In February,
1969 a contract was signed in Vienna, Austria, which provided for the transfer of the ownership of Scherk's enterprises to Alberto-Culver, along with all rights held by
these enterprises to trademarks in cosmetic goods. The
contract contained a number of express warranties
whereby Scherk guaranteed the sole and unencumbered

73-781-0:Pf:Nio:N
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ownership of these trademarks. In addition, the con ..
tract contained an arbitration clause providing that "any
controversy or claim [that] shall arise out of this agreement or the breach thereof" would be referred to arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce in
Paris, France, and that "[t]he laws of the State of
Illinois, U. S. A. shall apply to and govern this agree•
ment, its interpretation and performance." 1
The closing of the transaction took place in Geneva,
Switzerland, in June 1969. Nearly one year later
Alberto-Culver allegedly discovered that the trademark
rights purchased under the contract were subject to substantial encumbrances that threatened to give others
superior rights to the trademarks a.nd to restrict or preclude Alberto-Culver's use of them. Alberto-Culver
thereupon tendered back to Scherk the property that had
been transferred to it and offered to rescind the contract.
Upon Scherk's refusal, Alberto-Culver commenced this
action for damages and other relief in a federal district
1 The arbitration clause relating to the transfer of one of Scherk's
business entities, similar to the clauses covering the other two, reads
in its entirety as follows:
"The parties agree that if any controversy or claim shall arise out
of the agreement or the breach thereof and either party shall request
that the matter shall be settled by arbitration, the matter shall be
settled exclusively by arbitration in accordance with the rules then
obtaining of the International Chamber of Commerce, Parie,. France,
by a single arbitrator, if the parties shall agree upon one, or by one
arbitrator appointed by each party and a third arbitrator appointed
by the other arbitrators. In case of any failure of a party to make
an appointment referred to above within four weeks after notice of
the controversy, such appointment shall be made by said Chamber,
All ar bitration proceedings 8hall be held in Paris, France, and each
party agrees to comply in all respects with any award made in any
such proceeding and to the entry of a judgment in arty jurisdiction
upon any award rendered in such proceeding. The laws of the State
of Illmois, U. S. A. Rhall apply to and govern this agreement, its
interpretation and performance."

73-781-0PIN!ON
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a

court in Illinois, contending that Scherk's fraudulent representations concerning the status of the trademark
rights constituted violations of § 10 (b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1937, 15 U. S. C. § 78j, and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, 17 CFR §240.10b-5.
In response, Scherk filed a motion to dismiss the action
for want of personal and subject matter jurisdiction as
well as on the basis of forum non conviens, or, alterna..
tively, to stay the action pending arbitration in Paris
pursuant to the agreement of the parties. AlbertoCulver, in turn, opposed this motion and sought a pre·
liminary injunction restraining the prosecution of arbitration proceedings. 2 On December 2, 1971, the District
Court denied Scherk's motion to dismiss, and, on January 14, 1972, it granted a preliminary order enjoining
Scherk from proceeding with arbitration. In taking
these actions the Court relied entirely on this Court's
decision in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, which held that
an agreement to arbitrate could not preclude a buyer of
a security from seeking a judicial remedy under the
Securities Act of 1933, in view of the language of § 14
of that Act, barring " [a] ny condition, stipulation, or
provision binding any person acquiring any security to
waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter . . . ." 15 U. S. C. § 77n. 8 The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, with one judge dissenting, affirmed, upon what it considered the controlling
authority of the Wilko decision. 484 F. 2d 611. Because
of the importance of the question presented we granted
U. S. - .
Scherk's petition for a writ of certiorari. 2
Scherk had taken steps to mitiate arbitration in Paris in early
1971. He did not, however, file a formal request for arbitration with
the International Chamber of Commerce until November 9, 1971,
almost five months after the filing of Alberto-Culver's complaint in
the Illinois federal court.
3
The memorandum opinion of the District Court is unreported.
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I
The Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U. S. C. § 1 et seq.,
reversing centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements/ was designed to allow parties to avoid "the
costliness and delays of litigation," and to place arbitration agreements "upon the same footing as other contracts . . .." H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1 (1924); see also S. Rep. No. 556, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1924). Accordingly, the Act provides that an arbitration agreement such as is here involved "shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con ..
tract." 9 U. S. C. § 2. 5 The Act also provides in § 3
for a stay of proceedings in a case where a court is satisfied that the issue before it is arbitrable under the
agreement, and § 4 of the Act directs a federal court to
order parties to proceed to arbitration if there has been
a "failure, neglect, or refusal" of any party to honor an
agreement to arbitrate,
In Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427, this Court acknowledged that the Act reflects a legislative recognition of
4

English courts traditionally considered irrevocable arbitration
agreements as "ousting" the courts of jurisdiction, and refused to enforce such agreements for this reason. This view was adopted by
American courts as part of the common law up to the time of the
adoption of the Arbitration Act. See H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong,,
1st Sess., 1, 2 (1924); Sturges & Murphy, Some Confusing Matters
Relatmg to Arbitration under the United States Arbitration Act,
17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 580.
5 Section 2 of the Arbitration Act renders "valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable" written arbitration provisions "in any maritime
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce . . ," as those terms are defined in § 1. In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U. S. 198, this Court held that the stay provisions
of § 3 apply only to the two kinds of contracts specified in §§ 1 and 2.
Since the transaction in this case constituted "commerce . .. with
foreign nations," 9 U S. C. § 1, the Act clearly covers this agreement.
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court in Illinois, contending that Scherk's fraudulent representations concerning the status of the trademark
rights constituted violations of § 10 (b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1937, 15 U. S. C. § 78j, and Rule lOb-5
promulgated thereunder, 17 CFR §240.10b-5.
In response, Scherk filed a motion to dismiss the action
for want of personal and subject matter jurisdiction as
well as on the basis of forum non conviens, or, alternatively, to stay the action pending arbitration in Paris
pursuant to the agreement of the parties. AlbertoCulver, in turn, opposed this motion and sought a preliminary injunction restraining the prosecution of arbitration proceedings! On December 2, 1971, the District
Court denied Scherk's motion to dismiss, and, on January 14, 1972, it granted a preliminary order enjoining
Scherk from proceeding with arbitration. In taking
these actions the Court relied entirely on this Court's
decision in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, which held that
an agreement to arbitrate could not preclude a buyer of
a security from seeking a judicial remedy under the
Securities Act of 1933, in view of the language of § 14
of that Act, barring "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or
provision binding any person acquiring any security to
waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter . . . ." 15 U. S. C. § 77n.~ The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, with one judge dissenting, affirmed, upon what it considered the controlling
authority of the Wilko decision. 484 F. 2d 611. Because
of the importance of the question presented we granted
Scherk's petition for a writ of certiorari. U. S. - .
2
Scherk had taken steps to initiate arbitration in Paris in early
1971 . He did not, however, file a formal request for arbitration with
the International Chamber of Commerce until November 9, 1971,
almost five month,; after the filing of Alberto-Culver's complaint in
the Illinois federal court.
8
The memorandum opinion of the District Court is unreported,
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The Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U. S. C. ~ 1 et seq.,
reversing centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements/ was designed to allow parties to avoid "the
costliness and delays of litigation," and to place arbitration agreements "upon the same footing as other contracts ...." H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1 (1924); see also S. Rep. No. 556, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1924) . Accordingly, the Act provides that an arbitra.tion agreement such as is here involved "shall be valid,
jrrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con"
tract.'' 9 U. S. C. ~ 2. 5 The Act also provides in § 3
for a stay of proceedings in a case where a court is satisfied that the issue before it is arbitrable under the
agreement, and § 4 of the Act directs a federal court to
order parties to proceed to arbitration if there has been
a "failure, neglect, or refusal" of any party to honor an
agreement to arbitrate
In Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427, this Court acknowledged that the Act reflects a legislative recognition of
4

English rourt:; trad1t ionally ron:; ide red irrevocable arbitration
a:s "ou~ting" the court:; of jurisdiction, and refused to enforcr ::;uch agrerment:; for tht~< rra~on. This vww wa~< adopted by
Amrrican courts as part of the common law up to the time of the
adopt10n of thr Arbitration Act. Sec H . R. Hep. No. 96, 68th Cong.,
l:st Sr:,;:;., 1, 2 (1924); Sturge:; & Murphy, Some Confusing Matter:;
Relating to Arbitration under the United States Arbitration Act,
17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 5RO .
.~Section 2 of the ArbitratiOn Act rendPrs "valid, irrevocable,
and enforcrablr" wr)tten arbitration provi:sion;; "in any maritime
tran:-<aetion or a contract PvtdPnemg a tran~action involvmg commerre
," n~ tho::~e term:; are dPfined in§ I. In Bernhardt v. Polygraphu· Co ., 350 lJ . S. 198, thi~< Court held that the stay provisions
of § 3 apply only to thr two kmd~< of contract;; specified in §§ I and 2.
Smre the transaction m tlu:; rase rotlti(Jtuted ''commerce . . . with
fore1gn nation,.,,'' 9 U S C.§ 1, the Act clearly cover::; this agreement.
agreement~

\
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the "desirability of arbitration as an alternative to the
complications of litigation," id., at 431. but nonetheless
declined to apply the Act's provisions. That case
involved an agreement between Anthony Wilko and
Hayden, Stone & Co., a large brokerage firm, under which
Wilko agreed to purchase on margin a number of shares
of a corporation's common stock. Wilko alleged that
his purchase of the stock was induced by false represen·
tations on the part of the defendant concerning the value
of the shares, and he brought suit for damages under
§ 12 (2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77l.
The defendant responded that Wilko had agreed to submit all controversi~s arising out of the purchase to arbitration, and that this agreement, contained in a written
margin contract between the parties, should be given full
effect under the Arbitration Act,
The Court found that " [ t] wo policies, not easily reconcilable, [are] involved in this case." 346 U. S., at
438. On the one hand, the Arbitration Act stressed "the
need for avoiding the delay and expense of litigation," id,,
at 431, and directed that such agreements be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" in federal courts. On the
other hand, the Securities Act of 1933 was "[d]esigned to
protect investors" and to require "issuers, underwriters,
and dealers to make full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce
and to prevent fraud in their sale," by creating ua special
right to recover for misrepresentation .... " I d., at 431
(footnote omitted) . In particular, the Court noted that
~ 14 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S. C. ~ 77n, provides:
''Any condition , stipulation, or provision binding
auy person acquinng any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of
the rules and regulations of the Commission shall
be VOid .''
Thf' Court ruled that an agreement to arbitrate "is a
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'stipulation,' and [that 1 the right to select the judicial
forum is the kind of 'provision' that cannot be waived
under § 14 of the Securities Act."
Thus, Wilko's
advance agreement to arbitrate any disputes subsequently ansing out of his contract to purchase the securities was unenforcable under the terms of § 14 of the
Securities Act of 1933.
Alberto-Culver, relying on this precedent, contends
that the District Court and Court of Appeals were correct
1n holding that its agreement to arbitrate disputes arising
under the contract with Scherk is similarly unenforceable
in VIew of its contentions that Scherk's conduct constit.uted violations of the 3ecurities Exchange Act of 1934
and rules promulgated thereunder. For the reasons that
follow, we reject this contention and hold that the provisions of the Arbitration Act cannot be ignored in this
case.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that even the
semantic reasoning of the Wilko opinion does not control
the case before us. Wilko concerned a suit brought
under ~ 12 (2) of the Securities Act of 1933, which provides a defrauded purchaser with the "special right" of
a private remedy for civil liability, 346 U. S., at 431.
(i

ThC' arb1trahon agr<'C'ment mvolved m Wilko was cont2ined in a
form margin contract. But SC'e the dissmting opinion of
Mr . .Justice FrankfurtC'r, :Wi U. 8., at 439, 440, concluding that the
record d1d not show that "tlw plaintiff [Wilko] in opening an acrount had no chmce but to accept thC' arbitratiOn stipulation .... "
Tlw pC'titJOnC'r here would limit the decision in Wilko to situation~
where the partie'S c•xlHbJt a dispanty of bargaining power, and contend;; that, sincC' thC' 1wgotiation;; IC'ading to the present contract took
placC' over a numbC'r of yC'ar~ and involved the participation on both
;ndC'S of knowlC'dgC'able and t;oplu;;ticated bu~iness and legal experts,
thP Wilko decision should not apply. See also the dissenting opinion
of Judge Stevens of the Court of Apprals in this case, 484 F. 2d, at
615 Because of our dispos1t10n of th1s case on other grounds, we
need not con;;Jder th1s contention .
'

1

~tnndard
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There is no statutory counterpart of § 12 (2) in the
Securities Exchange Apt of 1934, and neither § 10 (b)
of that Act nor Rule 10b-5 speaks of a private remedy
to redress violations of the kind alleged here. While
federal case law has established that § 10 (b) and Rule
lOb-5 create an implied private cause of action, see
·'6 Loss, Securities 3869-3873 (1969) and cases cited
therein; cf. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1963),
the Act itself does not establish the "special right" that
the Court in Wilko found significant. Furthermore,
while both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 contain sections barring waiver of
compliance with any "provision" of the respective acts/
·certain of the "provisions" of the 1933 Act that the Court
held could not be waived by Wilko's agreement to arbitrate find no counterpart in the 1934 Act. In particular,
the Court in Wilko noted that the jurisdictional provision
'o f the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77v, allowed a plaintiff to
bring suit "in any court of competent jurisdictionfederal or state-and removal from a state court is prohibited." 346 U. S., at 431. The equivalent provision
of the 1934 Act, by contrast, provides for suit only in the
federal district courts that have "exclusive jurisdiction,"
7

Section 14 of the Securities Act. of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77n,
provides as follows ·
''Any cond1tion, ~tipnlation, or provision binding any person ac. qulring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this
subchapter or of the ntles and n~gulations of the Commission shall be
void."
Sertwn 29 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C.
§ 78cc (a), provides :
" Any condition, stipulation or provi::don binding nny person to
waive comp.linnce with any provision of th1s chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange reqmred thereby
shall be void ,"
While the two sections are not identical, the variations in their wording ~eem irrelevant to the issue presented in this case.
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15 U. S. C. § 78aa, thus significantly restricting the plain•
tiff's choice of forum .
Even if it could be said, however, that the operative
portions of the language of the 1933 Act relied upon in
Wilko are contained in the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, the respondent's reliance on Wilko in this case
ignores the significant and , we find, crucial differences
between the agreement involved in Wilko and the one
signed by the parties here. Alberto-Culver's contract
to purchase the business entities belonging to Scherk was
a truly international agreement. Alberto-Culver is an
American corporation with its principal place of business
and the vast bulk of its activity in this country, while
Scherk is a citizen of Germany whose companies were
organized under the laws of Germany and Liechtenstein.
The negotiations leading to the signing of the contract
in Austria and to the closing in Switzerland took place
in the United States, England, and Germany, and
involved consultations with legal and trademark experts
from each of those countries and from Liechtenstein.
Finally, and most significantly, the subject matter of the
contract concerned the sale of business enterprises organized under the laws of and primarily situated in European countries, and whose activities were largely, if not
entirely, directed to European markets.
Such a contract involves considerations and policies
significantly different from those found controlling in
Wilko. In Wilko , quite apart from the arbitration provision, there was no question but that the laws of the
United States generally, and the federal securities laws
in particular~ would govern disputes arising out of the
stock purchase agreement. The parties, the negotiations, and the subject matter of the contract were all
situated in this country, and no credible claim could have
been entertained that any international conflict of laws
problems would arise. In this case, by contrast, in the

r: ••
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absence of the arbitration provision considerable uncertainty existed at the time of the agreement, and still
exists, concerning the law applicable to the resolution of
disputes arising out of the contract. 8
Such uncertainty will almost inevitably exist with
respect to any contract touching two or more countries,
each with its own substantive laws and conflict of law
rules. A contractual provision specifying in advance the
forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the law to
be applied is, therefore. an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability
essential to any international business transaction. Furthermore, such a provision obviates the danger that a
dispute under the agreement might be submitted to a
forum hostile to the interests of one of the parties or
unfamiliar with the problem area involved.u
A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to
enforce an international arbitration agreement would
not only frustrate these purposes, but would invite
unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the
parties to secure tactical litigation advantages. In the
prrsent case, for example, it is not inconceivable that if
8 Togrther WJth its motiOn for a stay pending arbitration, Scherk
moved that the complaint be dismissed because the federal securities laws do not apply to this mtrrnational transaction, cf. Leasco

Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F. 2d 1326 (CA2
1972) Sine!' only the order granting the injunction was appealrd,
tllli:l contention was not considered by the Court of Appeals and IS
not hPfore th1s Court
u Sre Quigley, Accession by the Umted States to the Umted Nations
Convention on the Rreognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 70 Yale L ,J 1049 , 1051 (1961), For example, while the
arbitration agreement involvrd hrn' provided that thr controversJe.,; ansing out of the agrerment be resolvrd under "[t]he laws of
the 8tate of IllinOJs," supra, n. 1, a determination of the existence
and Pxtent of fraud concerning thr trademarks would neces::;arily
involvr an understanding of foreign law on that ~ubiect.

'

10
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cherk had anticipated that Alberto-Culver would bE!
able in this country to enjoin resort to arbitration he
might have sought an order in France or some other
country enjoining Alberto-Culver from proceeding with
its litigation in the United States. Whatever recognition
the courts of this country might ultimately have granted
to the order of the foreign court, the dicey atmosphere of
such a legal no-man's-land would surely damage the
fabric of international commerce and trade, and imperil
the willingnes and ability of businessmen to enter into
international commercial agreements.
The exception to the clear provisions of the Arbitration
Act carved out by Wilko is simply inapposite to a case
such as the one before us. In Wilko the Court reasoned
that "[w]hen the security buyer, prior to any violation
of the Securities Act, waives his right to sue in courts, he
gives up more than would a participant in other business
transactions. The security buyer has a wider choice of
courts and venue. He thus surrenders one of the advantages the Act gives him ... ." 346 U. S,, at 435. In the
context of an international contract, however, these
advantages become chimerical since, as indicated above,
an opposing party may by speedy resort to a foreign
court block or hinder access to the American court of the
purchaser's choice,
Two Terms ago in The Brernen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U. S. 1, we rejected the doctrine that a forumselection clause of a contract, although voluntarily
adopted by the parties, will not be respected in a suit
brought in the United States "unless the selected state
would provide a more convenient forum than the state
m which suit is brought." !d., at 7. Rather, we concluded that a "forum clause should control absent a
strong showing that it should be set aside." I d., at 15.
We noted that "much uncertainty and possibly great
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inconvenience to both parties could arise if a suit could
be maintained in any jurisdiction in which an accident
might occur or if jurisdiction were left to any place
[where personal or in rem jurisdiction might be established] . The elmination of all such uncertainties by
agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties
is an indispensable element in international trade, commerce, and contracting." !d., at 13-14.
An agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal
is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause
that posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute.' 0 The invalidation of such an agreement in the case before us would
not only allow the respondent to repudiate his solemn
promise but would, as well, reflect a "parochial concept
that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in
our courts . . . . We cannot have trade and commerce
in world markets and international waters exclusively on
our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our
courts. !d., at 9.11
For all these reasons we hold that the agreement of
the parties in this case to arbitrate any dispute arising
10 Under some circumstances, the designation of arbitration in a
certain place might also be viewed as implicitly selecting the law of
that plac~> to apply to that transaction. In this case, however, " [t]he
laws of the State of Illinois" were explicitly made applicable by the
arbitration agreement. See n. 1, s'Upra.
11 In The Bremen we uoted that forum-selection clauses "should be
given full effect" when ''a freely negotiated private international
agreement [is] unaffected by fraud .. .. " 407 U. S. 1, 12-13. This
qualification does not mean that any time a dispute arising out of
a tram;action is based upon an allegation of fraud, as in this case, the
clause 1s unenforceable. Rather, 1t means that an arbitration or
forum-selection clause in a contract is not enforceable if the inclu,sion
of that cla'Use in the contract was the product of fraud or coercion,
Compare Pnma Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg . Co., 388 U. S.

395.
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out of their international commercial transaction is to be
respected and enforced by the federal courts in accord
with the explicit prc>visions of the Arbitration Act. 12
Our conclusion today is confirmed by international developments and domestic lrgislation in the area of commercial arbitration subsequent to the fVilko decision. On June 10, 1958, a special
conference of the United Nations Economic and Social Council
adoptrd the Convention on the Hecognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards. In 1970 the Senate approved the treaty,
3 U.S. T . 2517, T . I. A. S. No. 6997, and Congress passed Chapter 2
of the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. §§ 201 ff., in order
to implement the Convention. Section 1 of the new chapter provides
unequivocally that the Convention "shall be enforced in United
States courts in accordance with this chapter."
The goal of the Convention, and the principal purpose underlying
American adoption and implementation of it, was to encourage the
recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in
international contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in
the signatory countries. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, S. Exec. E. 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1968); Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, 70 Yale L . .J. 1049 (1961). Article II (1) of the
Convention provides:
"Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or
any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them
in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual
or not, concerning n subject matter capable of settlement by
arbitration ."
In the1r discussion of this Article, the delegates to the Convention
voiced frequent concern that courts of signatory countries in which
an agreement to arbitrate is sought to be enforced should not be permitted to decline enforcement of such agreements on the basis of
parochial views of their desirability or in a manner that would
diminish the mutually binding nature of the agreements. See Haight,
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, Summary Analysis of Record of United Nations Conference
24-28 (1958).
Without reaching the issue of whether the Convention, apart from
12
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Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals i~
reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

the

consideration~>

expressed in this opmwn, would require of its
force that the agreement to arbitrate be enforced in the present
case, we think that this country'~ adoption and ratification of the
Convention and the passage of Chapter 2 of the United States Arbitration Act provide strongly persuasive evidence of congressional
policy consistrnt with the decision we reach today.
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

I have sent to the printer a dissent in No. 73-781
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Company.
Yours faithfully,
~V;

William 0. Douglas
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Scherk v. Alberto-Culver

Dear Potter:
Please join me in your opinion for the Court.
If I can find the time this week I may add a few
paragraph in a concurrence recording my view with respect
to the Securities Acts as applicable in this case.
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Stewart
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SCHERK v. ALBERTO-CULVER COMPANY

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I concur in the opinion of the Court and write only to
address an additional issue.

This action was instituted

by Alberto-Culver, alleging that it was defrauded in the
acquisition of Sherk's businesses in violation of

§

lO(b)

and Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1931.
In my view that Act has no application whatever to the
transaction involved in this litigation.

Indeed, its

application here finds no support in the terms of the Act
and is a perversion of plain congressional intent and
~~·

purpose reflected in the Act.

Section lO(b), in relevant part, provides that it
shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by use of the mails or any instrumentality of interstate
commerce, to "use or employ, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security registered on a national securities
exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative
or deceptive device in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Conmission may prescribe • • • • "

..'

2.
Rule lOb-5, in somewhat expansive terms, amplifies and makes
more specific the language of

§

lO(b).

But the core of these

provisions, as well indeed as of the entire Act, is the term
"security".

Unless a security is purchased or sold the Act

simply does not apply.

Section

-

(a)(lO) [15

u.s.c.

78(c)(a)(lO)) defines the term "security" broadly.*
Nothing is contained in the definition which remotely
embraces a purchase or sale of the assets of a business,
certainly in a context like the transaction involved in this
ease.
The relevant facts, as found by the District Court,
are as follows:

Seherk owned several businesses engaged

in the manufacture and distribution of cosmetic products
primarily in Western 2BXap¥a Europe.

Following protracted

negotiations, in which Alberto was represented by three
*Mere quote the entire paragraph defining security.

3.

law firms, an international accounting firm and patent
counsel, an agreement of purchase and sale of three of
Scherk's businesses was executed by the parties.

One of

these businesses, SEV, was a iiBBkBXxki••hxsaK Liechtenstein
business entity with no American counterpart, and as a part
of the transaction and at the request of Alberto SEV was
converted into Liechtenstein stock corporation.

It was

SEV which held the trademarks involved in this litigation.
As the District Court noted:
"The gist of plaintiff's complaint is that
defendant misrepresented the value and validity
of certain trademarks held by SEV which were
an integral component of the transaction in
question."
The District Court held that the transfer of all of SEV's
stock was a sale of securities within the meaning of
of the Act.

§

lO(b)

The Court of Appeals, with Judge Stevens

dissenting, affirmed.*
*the shares of one of the other businesses purchased, a
German corporation, were also transferred. But the alleged
fraud relates to the trademarks held by SEV.

4.
In a case of this kind, the substance of the transaction,
not its form, should control.

As the District Court found,

and indeed, the parties concede, Alberto-Culver desired to
acquire and in fact did acquire "three business entities".
These included a German corporation, a sole proprietorship,
and a Liechtenstein corporation formed upon the insistence
of Alberto-Culver.

Indeed, as conceded in oral argument

Alberto-Culver insisted on the incorporation of this entity
for its own tax purposes.*

Normally, a corporation desiring

to acquire another corporation will pursue one of three
methods:

(i) merger; (ii)purchase of stock, Which may be

followed by a liquidation; and (iii) purchase of assets
and assumption of liabilities.

The selection of the acquisition

method is usually influenced in major part by tax consequences,
*Cbeck the oral argument near the end to verify the
above.

5.
whether the stock of the corporation to be acquired is
widely held, whether 100% ownership is desired, and various
other business considerations.
Where a proprietorship or partnership is acquired,
the transaction may take the form simply of a sale of assets
or there may be an incorporation ai preliminary to the
transfer.

It is unnecessary to say that no acquisition of

an entire business, where the method employed is transfer
of stock, is ever convered by lO(b) of the Act.

There

may be situations where the substance or essence of the
transaction is in fact the purchase and sale of securities.
But certainly in a case where one large business interest
is seeking to

~

acquire the entire business of another

large interest for the purpose of operating it, if blinks
reality to say that a a•••xtx, security's transaction
occurs within the language and intent of

§

lO(b).

In this

case Alberto•Culver's purpose was to acquire these business
entities - their assets and going concern value - in
Western Europe.

Alberto-Culver desired to operate these

businesses itself, and was free from the time of acquisition

6.
to convert them into such business forms as best suited
its tax and business purposes.

It is plain that Alberto•

Culver had no interest in merely becoming a shareholder in
Scherk's enterprises.

In short, the purchase here was not

in any realistic sense a security's transaction.

It was the

100% acquisition of businesses by a strong, sophisticated
purchaser fully capable of making all necessary investigations,
and which indeed did make such investigations through
American and European and accountants.
There is nothing in the history or language structures
of the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 which remotely
suggest an intent or purpose to apply to transactions such
as this or to afford protection to parties such as AlbertoCulver.*
*tn Wilko v. Swan, 346 u.s. 427, 435 {1953), the Court
commented tha~t is clear that the Securities Act was
drafted with an eye to the disadvantages under which
buyers [of securities] labor. Issuers of and dealers in
securities have better opportunities to investigate and
appraise the prospective earnings and business plans
affecting securities than buyers."

7.
The complaint in this case should have been
dismissed.

'

'

MEMORANDUM

TO:

Mr. John Jeffries

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

June 3, 1974

No. 73-!81 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Here is a rough draft of a concurrence in Alberto-Culver
which I would appreciate your putting in appropriate form,
assuming that you see no fatal flaw in my reasoning.
I am aware that there are Circuit Court opinions which
have gone quite far in applying lO(b) and lOb-S to transactions
that I would consider not within the scope of the Act.

One

or two of these cases are cited in the opinions below.

I

would appreciate your adding in a note a reference to at least
two or three of such cases, indicating that although some
Circuit Courts have gone rather far in extending the original
purpose and meaning of§ lO(b), this Court has had no occasion
to consider the application of the Act to a situation comparable
to that presently involved.
One other point.

Justice Stewart's opinion does not

mention this issue, as it was not presented to us as one of
the errors assigned.

I will ask Justice Stewart to add a note

to his opinion stating that for this reason the Court does
not address the issue.

If he is unwilling to do this, I will

have to add a note genera.lly to that effect, and saying further

2.

that in my view this issue having been raised by the pleadings
and considered by the courts below is one which we are free to
consider and as it goes to the viability of the entire litigation, disposes of the case.

L.F.P., Jr.
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v. Al]?erto-Culver Co.

Dear Potter:
Wbilel aar•• with t - ~••ult you. rea:eh and with moat Ql
the reaaoning by •bleb you arriv• at that reeult, 1 have some
difficulty at two pointe in your propo•ed opinion. 1 hopt~ you do
not mind too much tf 1 venture to state the source• of my difficulty.

f A
t.1J ~rv~W /r~A
~f
~{

1. I euapeet the benefit o£ the rather technical dietinetion
you draw betweeD. the 11 epec:1al rightH in '!ilko and ita abaenee in
tbia ea•e f dleeu•••d on pages 6-s· is marginal and doe• uot really
, ~ ~
juttify it• ineluaion. I am not entirely certain that 1 agre"e with
J~
the dletinction. 1t •••m• to me that tb implied right of action
J
under the Cou.l't'a deciaton• 1• not diffe~n.t from th• •o ... uUecl
'1.. · . . {1 u•peeial right 11 in ~ Vlilko caee, tinc:e the implied right adhere•
Jid~~ .L to ltule lOb-5 and § 10 of the Act, and is the.-eby lnc:luded in the
·~ J ~ V' ew&ep of S29(a). I ••• no apparent rea.e011 why the two are
unl.J. cAJ:J~~- different. Evan if the diatinetion ie a p:roper one, you hint on
--1-r ~'fb... J
page 8 that the di.ecuaeion 1 som....,ha.t gra.tuit ue. For me, it
1.,u.o ~-u_~ :rabee more quei!Jtiona than lt anawere and it aeema that it 18
likely to
problema in later caaae in which the waiftr pro ..

J .

JR:;;

"r"

v<>••

vleione are •••erted aa a d.ef•n.ee.

<ft{A, ~ t ~
~

c.

in~Uned to b4tlieve that more prominence should

subetanee, but it 18, I beli.eve
. • important. You r.efer to the ConUlt.cH/L_!ention in your final footnote. but I wonder whether it doea not
deserve a higher le,_l of zecognition. I would propo•e that the
.
lollowing,
or ecmethi.ng •imilar to it, be inserted •fter your
1
,~n-u. first: para.g,..aph on page 4 of your opini•r.H
Ct.

wJt..

't1A.A..

1 am

_r!J '~~';
United State• Arbitration Act that make the Convention a part of
t.vlffl..~ thelaw of tbte country. Thi• ia more a matter o! empha.ab than

~~

A

a..

be given to the Arbitral Convention and to those provisions of the

.~ .

- z"Chapter Z of the Act, 9 U. S. C. §§ ZO 1,
et
provide• for the recognition and enforcement of :foraign arbitral awards. It wae enacted
in 1970 to implement the Unitecl Nation• Conwntion
on the
cognition and Enforcer.nent of Foreign
Arbitral Award•.
etta 1 of the new chapter unequivocally providtta that the Convention 'shall be
enforced in United. State• court• in accordance with
thia chapter. I The goal Of the Ccm...-ntiOn, &nd the
principal purpoee underlying American adoption of
it and ita implementation, waa to encourage the rec: ..
ognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration
agr. .menta in interD&ticmal contract• and to unify
the standard• by which aareementa to a.rbitrate are
obeerved and a
awarcl• are enforced in signatory coUDtriea.- Article U(3) of the Convention
provide a:

••9·,

._bJ-tnl

'The cCMart of a Contra.c:ting State, when
seized of an actioa in a matter in re•pec:t
of which tiMt parties have made an agree·
ment within the meaning of thi.• article,
eball, at the reque•t of one of the partie•,
refer the partie• to arbitration unlee• it
find• that the said agreement ie cull and
void, inoperative or incapable of beina
performed. '

Thue, a low court, when lei &eel of an action like the
pretent c:aee, ahould, at the NfiUet of one of the
partie•, refer the partie• to arbitration, unlet• tbe
arbitral agi'W111ent b 'aull &ftd -.oid, iRoperatiw or
incapable of being perfot"med. '!!/ Hen, reapondent
contend• that the agJ"Mment t• voided by S 29(a) of the
Securitiee Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S. c. § 78cc(a).
providing:
'Any condition, atipulation, or provieion
binding any ~reon to 'W&ive c:ompUance
with any provieion of thie chapter o r of

- l -

any rule or rqulation thereunder, or
of any rule of an exchange required
thereby shall be void.' 11
The two footnote• would be., reapectively:

"*I

- s.. Convention on the Recognition and Enforce·
ment of Foreian Arbitral Awarde, S. Exec. E. 90th Cona. ,
Zd Seee. (1968): Quigley, Acceaaion by the United State•
to the United Natioaa Coa:nntion on the Recosllitt.on and
Enforcement of Foreian Arbitral Award•, 70 Yale L. J.
1049 (1961). tl

-

ll • • ,

Article n(l) alao limita recognition of agreemente to thoee •concerning a subject matter capable of
eettlement by arbitration. • The leauee raiaed tn thia caee
are appropriate for arbitration. See db cue aion, infra,
page_.''

You will obeene th&t much of the pnceding paraaraph track•
material in your preaent footnote lZ.
3. 1 would be inclbed to add the following to footnote 11.
"Altbouah we do not decide the queation., pn•umably the type of fraud alleged here could be
challenged, under Article V of the Co.n.vation, ln the
enforcement of whatever arbitral award ia produced
through arbitration. Article V(Z)(b) provide• that
recognition and eDforcernent Of u award caa be refused if 'recoanition or enfol'cement of tM award
would be ccm.trary to the public policy of that cOUDtry. •"
The•e are my thought•. for what they may be worth. 1 am
taking the Uberty of aendin.l cople• of thie letter to the Chief,

.

- ..
Lewia, and Bill Rehnquiat, who, aloq with us, have indicated
a vote to rever••·
Sincerely, ·

cc: The Chief Ju•tice /
Mr. Ju•tice Pow.U
Mr. .Juatice Rehnqui•t

.
'

.:§u.vrtmt Q):a-nrl cf tlft ~ttifth .:§tafts

~asfrin:ghm.

tEJ. Q):.
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CHAM BERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUI S T

June 5, 1974

Re:

Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.

Dear Potter:
Please join me in the opinion for the Court you
have prepared in this case.
Sincerely,

w-:~---·

Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference

To

The Chief'

J'usff~.g...;-:·':-."

Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice M~rshall
Mr. ,Tusttco BJ.'lC 1'mun
If.•·. .!us·J:ice Powell ...---Rehnquist
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MR. JusTICE DouGLAS, dissenting.
Respondent (Alberto) is a publicly held corporation
whose stock is traded on the New York Stock Exchange.
Alberto, a Delaware Corporation, has its principal place
of business in Illinois. Petitioner (Scherk) owned a
business in Germany, FLS (Firma Ludwig Scherk), dealing with cosmetics and toiletries. Scherk owned various
trade marks and all outstanding securities of a Liechtenstein corporation (SEV) and of a German corporation
(Lodeva). Scherk owned various trade marks which
were licensed to manufacturers and distributors in Europe
and in this country. SEV collected the royalties on those
licenses.
Alberto undertook to purchase from Scherk the entire
establishment-the trade marks and the stock of the two
corporations; and later, alleging it had been defrauded,
brought this suit in the U. S. District Court in Illinois to
rescind the agreement and to receive damages.
The only defense, material at this stage of the proceeding is a provision of the contract providing that if any
controversy or claim arises under the agreement the
parties agree it will be settled "exclusively" by arbitration
under the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, Paris, France.
The basic dispute between the parties concerned aile..
gations that the trademarks which were basic assets in

J.
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the transaction were encumbered and that their purchase
was induced through serious instances of fraudulent
representations and omissions by Scherk and his agents
within the jurisdiction of the United States. If a question of trademarks were the only one involved the principle of The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U. S. 1,
would be controlling.
We have here, however, questions under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 which in§ 3 (a) (10) defines "security" as including any "note, stock, treasury stock, bonds,
debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement . . . ." 15 U.S. C.§ 78c (a) (10).
We held in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332, as
respects § 3 (a) ( 10) .
" . . . [R]emedial legislation should be construed '
broadly to effectuate its purposes. The Securities
Exchange Act quite clearly falls into the category
of remedial legislation. One of its central purposes
is to protect investors thr~ugh the requirement of full
disclosure by issuers of securities, and the definition
of security in § 3 (a)(10) necessarily determines the
classes of investments and investors which will receive the Act's protections. Finally, we are reminded that, in searching for the meaning and scope
of the word 'security' in the Act, form should be
disregarded for substance and the emphasis should
be on economic reality." !d., at 336. (Footnote
omitted.)
Section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act makes it unlawful for
any person by use of agencies of interstate commerce or
the mails "to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security," whether or not registered
on a national securities exchange, "any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe."
15
§ 78j (b).

u. s. c.
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Alberto, as noted, is not a private person but a corporation with publicly held stock listed on the New York Exchange. If it is to be believed, if in other words the
allegations made are proven, the American company has
been defrauded by the issuance of "securities" (promissory notes) for assets which are worthless or of a much
lower value than represented. The Regulations of the
Commission state :
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumen•
tality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud,
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security." 17 CFR
§ 240.10b-5.
Section 2g. (a) of the Act provides:
" Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding
any person to waive compliance with any provision
of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby
shall be void.'' 15 U. S. C. § 78cc (a) .
And § 29 (b) adds that "every contract" made in violation of the Act "shall be void." 1 No exception is made
1
Section 29 (b) reads : "Every contract made in violation of any
provi<>ion of t his chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, an4
~very contract (including any contract for listing a security on at!-

'

.
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for contracts which have an international character.
The 1933 Act, 48 Stat. 84, 15 U. S. C. § 77n had a like
provision in its § 14:
"Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding
any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of
the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be
void."
In Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427, a customer brought
suit against a brokerage house alleging fraud in the sale
of stock. A motion was made to stay the trial until an
arbitration under the U. S. Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C.
§ 3. as provided in the customer's contract. The Court
held that an agreement for arbitration was "stipulation" within the meaning of~ 14 which sought to "waive"
compliance with the Act. We accordingly held that the
courts, not the arbitration tribunals, had jurisdiction over
suits under the Act. The arbitration agency, we held,
was bound by other standards which were not necessarily
consistent with the 1933 Act. We said :
"As the protective provisions of the Securities
Act require the exercise of judicial direction to fairly
assure their effectiveness, it seems to us that Congress must have intended § 14 ... to apply to waiver
of judicial trial and review." !d., at437.

a

exchange) heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of which
involves the violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or
practice in violation of, any provision of this chapter or any rule or
regulation thereunder, shall be void (1) as regards the rights of
any person who, in violation of any such provision, rule, or regulation, shall have made or engaged in the performance of any such
contract, and (2) as regards the rights of any person who, not being
a party to such contract, shall have acquired any right thereunder
with actual knowledge of the facts by reason of which the making or
performance of such contract was in violation of any such provision,
rule or regttlation ...•" 15 U. S. C. § 78cc (b) .
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Wilko was held by the Court of Appeals to control this
case-and properly so.
It could perhaps be argued that Wilko does not govern
because it involved a little customer pitted against a big
brokerage house, while we deal here with sophisticated
buyers and sellers: Scherk. a powerful German operator,
and Alberto. an American business surroullded and protected by lawyers and experts. But that would miss the
point of the problem . The Act does not speak in tenns
of "sophisticated" as opposed to "tmsophisticated" pMplEJ
dealing ill securities. The Rules when the giants play
are the same as when the pigmies enter the market.
If there are victims here, they are 'not Alberto the
corporation, but the thousands of investors who are the
security holders in Alberto-Culver Co. If there is fraud
and the promissory notes are excessive, the impact is on
the equity in Alberto-Culver Co.
Moreover, the securities market these days is not made
up of a host of small people scrambling to get in and out
of stocks or other securities. The markets are overshadowed by huge institutional traders. 2 The so-called
11
off-shore funds" of which Scherk is a member present
perplexing problems under both the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 8
The tendency of American investors to invest indirectly
as through mutual funds 4 may change the character of
the regulation but not its need.
There has been much support for arbitration of disputes; and it may be the superior way of settling some disagreements. If A and B were quarreling over a trademark and there was an arbitration clause in the contract,
the policy of Congress in implementing the United N~
2 Sec In ~ti tutional Investor Study Rex)ort of t.he SEC, H.
No 92-64 ( 1971) , particularly Vol. 4,
SJd., p. XVI, p. 879 et seq.
"ld., p. XIX, p. 215 et seq.

~-
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tions Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Aw·ards as it did in 9 U. S. C.
§ 201 et seq., would prevail. But the Act does not substitute an arbiter for the settlement of disputes under
the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Art. II (3) of the Convention
says:
"The court of a Contracting State, when seized
of an action in a matter in respect of which the
parties have made an agreement within the meaning
of this article, shall, at the request of one of the
parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds
that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative
or incapable of being performed." 5
But § 29 (a) of the 1934 Act makes arbitration of liabilities under ~ 10 of the 1934 Act "void" and "inoperative." Congress has specified a precise way whereby big
and small investors will be protected and the rules under
wihch the Alberto-Culver Co/s of this Nation shall operate. They or their lawyers cannot waive those statutory conditions, for our corporate giants are not principalities of power but guardians of a host of wards unable
to care for themselves. It is these wards that the 1934
Act tries to protect.'; Not a word in the convention govr. The Convention al~o pPrmits that nrbitral awards not be
recognized and pnforced wlwn a court in the country where enforcement. ls sought find<; that ''thr recognition and enforcement of the
award would be contrary to the public policy of that country."
Article V (2) (b) . It aliso providP;:; that recognition of an award
may be rrfusrd when thr arbitration agreement ''is not valid under
the law to which thr partir;; havr ~ubjectrd it," in this ca~:;e the hws
of Illinois. See n. 10, infra. Article V (1) (a) .
6
Requirements promulgated under the 1934 Act requirr revelation to security holder~ of corpornte action which may nffect them.
Extenstve annual report.~ must be filed with the SEC including,
irtter alia, financial figurr;:;, change~; in t hP conduct of business, tho
acqm~Jtion or dispo~itiou of assQti>, increase~; or decreases in out.
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erning awards adopts the standards which Congress has
passed to protect the investors under the 1934 Act. It is
peculiarly appropriate that we adhere to Wilko-more so
even than when Wilko was adopted. Huge foreign investments, many of them composed of the blackmail
money we now pay for oil, are being made in our companies. It is important that American standards of fair•
ness in security dealings, rather than these impromptu
ones framed by "some friend in an arbital court in Paris''
govern the destinies of American investors-until Con•
gress changes these standards.
The Court finds it unnecessary to consider Scherk's
argument that this case is distinguishable from Wilko in
that Wilko involved parties of unequal bargaining
strength. Ante, at 6 n. 6. Instead, the Court rests its
standing ::;ecurities, and even the importance to the business of trademarks held. See 17 CFR §§ 240.13a-1, 249.310; 3 CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. ~31,101 et seq. (Form 10 K). The Commission has proposed that corporations furnish a copy of annual reports filed with
the SEC to any security holder who is solicited for a proxy and requests the report. 39 Fed. Reg. 3836. Current reports must be
filed with the SEC by an issuer of securities when substantial events
occur, as when the rights evidenced by any class of securities are'
materially altered by the issuance of another class of securities or
when an issuer ha::; acquired a significant amount of assets other than
in thP. ordinary course of business. See 17 CFR §§ 240.13a-ll,
249.308; 3 CCH Ff'd. Sec. L. Rep. ~ 31,001 et seq. (Form 8-K).
The SEC, recogmzing that the Form 10-K r!:'port::; filed annually
with the Commission might. be !:'xcessively abstruse for security holders, ·ee 39 Fed. Reg. 3835, has proposed that the annual reports distributed to security holders in connection with annual meetings and
solicitation of proxies provide substantially greater amounts of
Jheanmgful information than required presently. These annual reports would include a description of the busines::; of the issuer, a
summary of operations, explanation of changes in revenues and expenses, informa.tion on the liquidity position and the working capital
requirements of the issuer, and identification of management and'
performance on the market of the issuer's securities. See 39 Fed~
Reg. 3834-3838.
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-conclusion on the fact that this was an "international''
agreement. with an American corporation investing in
the stock and property of foreign businesses, and speaks
favorably of the certainty which inheres when parties
specify an arbitral forum for resolution of differences in
"any contract touching two or more countries."
This invocation of the "international contract" talisman could as easily be applied to a situation where, for
example, an interest in a foreign company or mutual
fund was sold to an utterly unsophisticated American
citizen, with material fraudulent misrepresentations made
in this country. The arbitration clause could appear in
the fine print of a form contract, and still be sufficient
to preclude recourse to our courts, forcing the defrauded
citizen to arbitration in Paris to vindicate his rights.
It has been recognized that the 1934 Act, including
the protections of Rule lOb-5, applies when foreign
defendants have defrauded American investors, particularly when, as alleged here/ they have profited by virtue
of proscribed conduct within our boundaries. This is
true even when the defendant is organized under the
laws of a foreign country, is conducting much of its
activity outside the United States, and is therefore governed largely by foreign law. 8 The language of § 29 of
7
Th8 District Court for the 'Northern Di~trict of Illinois noted
allegations that Scherk bad failed to state a matrrial fact the omissiOn of which would have bren misleading, see 17 CFR § 240.10b-5
(2), during crucial negotiations in Melrose Park, Illinois, and that
communications betwren Alberto and Scherk'~> attorney concerning
the validity and value of the trademark;; occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of t]w United StatC's. Finally, the District Court
noted that the full economic impact of the alleged fraud occurred
within thC' UnitPd States.
8 SeP, e. g., Leasco Data Processing Equip . Cm·p. v. Maxwell, 468
F . 2d 1326, 1334-1339 (CA2 1972) ; T1·avis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd.,
473 F. 2d 515, 52:3-528 (CA8 1973); SEC' v. United Financial Group,
lnc., 474 F . 2cl 354 (CA9 1973) ; Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.
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the 1934 Act does not immunize such international transactions, and the United Nations Convention provides
that a forum court in which a suit is brought need not
enforce an agreement to arbitrate which is "void" and
"inoperative" as contrary to its public policy." When a
2d 200 (CA2 1968); Roth v. Fund of Fund&. 279 F. Supp. 935, aff'd,
405 F. 2d 421 (CA2 1968).
0 A summary of the conference proceedings which led to the adop"
tion of the United Natiohs Convention was prepared by G. W. Haight,
who served as a member of the International Chamber of Commerce
delegation to the conference. G. Haight, Convention on the Recog•
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: Sumary Analy·
sis of Record of United Nations Conference, Mayj June 1958 (1958) .
When Art. II (3) wa~ being discussed, the Israeli delegate pointed
out that while a court could, under the draft Convention as it then
stood, refuse enforcement of an award which was incompatible with
public policy, " 't he court had to refer parties to arbitration whether
or not such reference was lawful or incompatible with public policy.'"
!d., at 27. The German delegate observed that this difficulty arose
from the omission in Art. II (3) "'of any words which would relate
the nrbit.ral agreement to an arbitral award capable of enforcement
under the convention.',. Ibid .
Haight continue ·:
"When the German propo:;al was put to a vote, it failed to obtain
u two-thirds majority (13 to 9) and the Article wa::; thus adopted
without, any wordii linking agreements to the award:; enforceable
undN the Convention. Nor was this omission corrected in the
ReporL of the Drafting Committee (1.61), although the obligatwn
to refer parties to arbitration was (and still is) qualified by the

clause 'unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative
or incapable of being performed.'
''As the applicable law i~:; not indicated, courts may under this
wording be allowed some latitude ; they may find an agreement

incapable of performance if it offends the lau• or the public policy
vf the forum . Apart from this limited opening. the Conference
appeared unwilling to qualify the broad undertaking not. only to
recognize but also to give effect to arbitral agreements.'' I d., at 28
( empha~i~ added).
Whatever ''concern" the delegate~ had that ~ignatories to the Convention "not be permitted to decline enforcement of suc)l agree-
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foreign corporation undertakes fraudulent action which
subjects it to the jurisdiction of our federal securities laws,
nothing justifies the conclusion that only a diluted version of those laws protect American investors.
Section 29 (a) of the Act provides that a stipulation
biuding one to waive compliance with "any provision"
'of the 1934 Act shall be void, and the 1934 Act expressly
provides that the federal district courts shall have "exclusive jurisdiction" over suits brought under the Act. 15
U. S. C. § 78aa. The Court appears to attach some
significance to the fact that the specific provisions of thfl
1933 Act involved in Wilko are not duplicated in the
1934 Act, which is involved in this case. While Alberto
would not have the right to sue in either a state or federal
forum as did the plaintiff in Wilko, 346 U. S., at 431,
the Court deprives it of its right to have its lOb-5 claim
heard in a federal court. We spoke at length in Wilko
of this problem, elucidating the undesirable effects of
remitting a securities plaintiff to an arbitral, rather than
a judicial, forum. Here, as in Wilko, the allegations of
ments on the bru;is of parochial view~ of their desirability," ante,
at 12 n. 12, it would seem that they contemplated that a court may
decline to enforce an agreement which offends its law or public
policy.
The Court. al~o attempts to treat this ca:oe as only a minor varialion of 1'he Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S . 1. In that
ca:-;e, however, the Court, per BuRGER, C. J ., explicitly ~tatecl that:
"A contractual choice-of-forum rlause :,;hould be held unenforceable

if the enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the
forum in which suit is brought , whether declared by statute or by
judicial decision." I d., at 15.
That is mescapably the case herE', as § 29 of the SecuritiE'~:~ Exchange
Act and Wilko v. Swan make ciE'ar. Nl'ither § 29, nor the ConventJon on international arbitration , nor The Bremen justifies abandonment of a national publir polic~· that ;;ecuritil's claims be heard by
a judicial forum simply becau:oe some international elements are
involvecl in a contract.•
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fraudulent misrepresentation will involve "subjective
findings on the purpose and knowledge" of the defendant,
questions ill determined by arbitrators without judicial
instruction on the law. See id., at 435-436. An arbitral
award can be made without explication of reasons and
with development of a record, so that the arbitrator's
conception of our statutory requirement may be absolutely
incorrect yet functionally unreviewable. even when the
arbitrator seeks to apply our law, We recognized in
Wilko that there is no judicial review correstJonding to
review of court decisions. !d., at 436-437. The exten•
$ive pretrial discovery provided by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure for actions in District Court would not
be available. And the wide choice of venue provided by
the 1934 Act. 15 U. S. C. § 78aa, would be forfeited. See
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S., at 431, 435. The loss of the
proper judicial forum carries with it the loss of substantial righ ts. 10
When a defendant, as alleged here, has through proscribed acts within our territory brought itself within
the ken of federal securities regulation. a fact not dis- ·
puted here. those laws-including the controlling principles of Wilko-apply whether the defendant is foreign :
or American, and whether or not there are transnational
elements in the dealings. Those laws are rendered a
chimera when foreign corporations or funds-unlike
domestic defendants-can nullify them by virtue of
to Tho agrrcment:; in

thi~

caso providrd that the "laws of the

State of Illinois" are applicable. Even if the urbitration court
should reud this clau:;fl to re({uirfl application of Rule 10b--5's
stundurds, Alberto';; victory would be Pyrrhic. The arbitral court
mar improperly interpret the sub~tantive protections of the Rule,
and if it does it:; error will no1 be reviewable as would the error
of a federal court. And the abil~ty of Alberto to prosecute its
claim would be !'VISCerated by lack of ~covery. The;;e are the
policy con;;ideration;; which underlay Wilko and which apply to the
JOi:itanL case as well.

.
1
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arbitration clauses which send defrauded American investors to the uncertainty of arbitration on foreign soil, or,
what may be more likely, to no remedy at all.
Moreover, the international aura which the Court gives
this case is ominous. We now have many multi-national
corporations in vast operations around the world-Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia. The investments of many American investors turn on dealings
by these companies. pp to ·this day, it has been assumed
by reason of Wilko that they were all protected by our
various federal securities Acts. If these guarantees are
to be removed, it should take a legislative enactment.
I would enforce our laws as they stand, unless Congress
makes an exception.
The virtue of certainty in international agreements is
important, but Congress has dictated that when there
. are sufficient contacts for our securities laws to apply,
the policies expressed in those laws take precedence.
Section 29, which renders arbitration clauses void and
inoperative, recognizes no exception for fraudulent dealings which incidentally have some international factors,
The Convention makes provision for such national public
policy in Art. II (3). Federal jurisdiction under the 1934
Act will attach only to some international transactions,
but when it does, the protections afforded investors such
as Alberto can only be full-fledged.
To repeat, the interests of investors in American
.companies are involved here. Justice Brandeis starting
· nearly 70 years ago tried to educate the Nation on the
practices of the money trust. The giants of finance are
the money trust today. They are the ones that fought
· the 1933 and 1934 Acts tooth and nail. They are the
; ones hopeful of short circuiting the protective devices
of those Acts by using arbitration as a newly found
loophole.

1fp/ss
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Scherk v. Alberto-Culver

Suggested note to be added to the opinion of the Court:

"We do not reach, or infer any opinion as to, the
question whether the acquisition of Scherk's businesses
was a security transaction within the meaning of

§

lO(b)

and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Although this important question was considered by the
District Court and the Court of Appeals, and the dissenting
opinion, infra, seems to consider it controlling, petitioner
did not assign the adverse ruling on the Question as error
and it was not briefed or argued in this Court."
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MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Alberto-Culver Co., the respondent, is an American
company incorporated in Delaware with its principal
office in Illinois. It manufactures and distributes toiletries and hair products in this country and abroad. During the 1960's Alberto-Culver decided to expand its
overseas operations, and as part of this program it
approached the petitioner Fritz Scherk, a German citizen
residing at the time of trial in Switzerland. Scherk was
the owner of three interrelated business entities, organized under the laws of Germany and Liechtenstein, that
were engaged in the manufacture of toiletries and the
licensing of trademarks for such toiletries. An initial
contact with Scherk was made by a representative of
Alberto-Culver in Germany in June, 1967, and negotia~
tions followed at further meetings in both Europe and
the United States during 1967 and 1968. In February,
1969 a contract was signed in Vienna, Austria, which provided for the transfer of the ownership of Scherk's enterprises to Alberto-Culver, along with all rights held by
these enterprises to trademarks in cosmetic goods. The
contract contained a number of express warranties
wllereby Scherk guaranteed the sole and unencumber~d
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ownership of these trademarks. In addition, the coli"
tract contained an arbitration clause providing that "any
controversy or claim [that] shall arise out of this agreement or the breach thereof" would be referred to arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce in
Paris, France, and that "[t]he laws of the State of
Illinois, U. S. A. shall apply to and govern this agreement, its interpretation and performance." 1
The closing of the transaction took place in Geneva,
Switzerland, in June 1969. Nearly one year later
Alberto-Culver allegedly discovered that the trademark
rights purchased under the contract were subject to substantial encumbrances that threatened to give others
superior rights to the trademarks and to restrict or preclude Alberto-Culver's use of them. Alberto-Culver
thereupon tendered back to Scherk the property that had
been transferred to it and offered to rescind the contract.
Upon Scherk's refusal, Alberto-Culver commenced this
action for damages and other relief in a federal district
1 The arbitration clause relating to the transfer of ~me of Scherk's
business entities, similar to the clauses covering the other two, reads
in its entirety as follows :
"The parties agree that if any controversy or claim shall arise out
of the agreement or the breach thereof and either party shall request
that the matter shall be settled by arbitration, the matter shall be
settled exclusively by arbitration in accordance with the rules then
obtaimng of the International Chamber of Commerce, Pari8, France,
by a single arbitrator, if the parties shall agree upon one, or by one
arbitrator appointed by each party and a third arbitrator appointed
by the other arbitrators. In case of any failure of a party to make
an appointment referred to above within four weeks after notice of
the controversy, such appointment shall be made by said Chamber.
All arbitration proceedings shall be held in Paris, France, and each
party agrees to comply in all respects with any award made in any
such proceeding and to the entry of a judgment in any jurisdiction
upon any award rendered in such proceeding. The laws of the State
of Illinois, U. S. A. shall apply to and govern this agreement, jts
, )llter;pretatwn and performance."

'

.
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the "desirability of arbitration as an alternative to the
complications of litigation," id., at 431, but nonetheless
declined to apply the Act's provisions. That case
involved an agreement between Anthony Wilko and
Hayden, Stone & Co., a large brokerage firm, under which
Wilko agreed to purchase on margin a number of shares
of a corporation's common stock. Wilko alleged that
his purchase of the stock was induced by false representations on the part of the defendant concerning the value
of the shares, and he brought suit for damages under
§ 12 (2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 71l.
The defendant responded that Wilko had agreed to submit all controversies arising out of the purchase to arbi•
tration, and that this agreement, contained in a written
margin contract between the parties, should be given full
effect under the Arbitration Act,
The Court found that " [ t] wo policies, not easily reconcilable, [are] involved in this case." 346 U. S., at
438. On the one hand, the Arbitration Act stressed "the
need for avoiding the delay and expense of litigation," id. 1
at 431, and directed that such agreements be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" in federal courts. On the
other hand, the Securities Act of 1933 was " [d] esigned to
protect investors" and to require "issuers, underwriters,
and dealers to make full and fair disclosure of the charac..
ter of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce
and to prevent fraud in their sale," by creating "a special
right to recover for misrepresentation ...." !d., at 431
(footnote omitted). In particular, the Court noted that
§ 14 of the Securities Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77n, provides:
" Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding
any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of
the rules and regulations of the Commission shall
be void."
The Court ruled that an agreement to arbitrate "is a
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'stipulation/ and [that] the right to select the judicial
forum is the kind of 'provision' that cannot be waived
under § 14 of the Securities Act." 6 Thus, Wilko's
advance agreement to arbitrate any disputes subsequently arising out of his contract to purchase the securities was unenforcable under the terms of § 14 of the
Securities Act of 1933.
Alberto-Culver, relying on this precedent, contends
that the District Court and Court of Appeals were correct
in holding that its agreement to arbitrate disputes arising
under the contract with Scherk is similarly unenforceable
in view of its contentions that Scherk's conduct constituted violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and rules promulgated thereunder.. For the reasons that
follow, we reject this contention and hold that the proVIsions of the Arbitration Act cannot be ignored in this
.case.
At the outset, a colorable argument could be made that
even the semantic reasoning of the Wilko opinion does
not control the case before us. Wilko concerned a suit
brought under ~ 12 (2) of the Securities Act of 1933,
which provides a defrauded purchaser with the "special
right" of a private remedy for civil liability, 346 U.S., at
The arbitration agreement involved in Wilko was contained in a
standard form margin contract. But see the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 346 U. S., at 439, 440, concluding that the
record did not show that "the plaintiff [Wilko] in opening an account had no choice but to accept the arbitration stipulation . ..."
The petitioner here would limit the decision in Wilko to situations
where the parties exhibit a disparity of bargaining power, and contends that, since the negotiations leading to the present contract took
place over a number of years and involved the participation on both
sides of knowledgeable and sophisticated business and legal experts,
the Wilko decision should not apply. See also the dissenting opinion
of Judge Stevens of the Court of Appeals in this case, 484 F. 2d, at
615. Because of our disposition of this case on other grounds, we
need not consider this contention.
6
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431 There is no statutory counterpart of§ 12 (2) in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and neither § 10 (b)
of that Act nor Rule 10b-5 speaks of a private remedy
to redress violations of the kind alleged here. While
federal case law has established that § 10 (b) and Rule
lOb-5 create an implied private cause of action, see
6 Loss, Securities 3869-3873 (1969) and cases cited
therein; cf. J. I. Case Co. v. Boraie, 377 U. S. 426 ( 1963),
the Act itself does not establish the "special right" that
the Court in Wilko found significant. Furthermore 1
while both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 contain sections barring waiver of
compliance with any "provision'' of the respective acts/
certain of the "provisions" of the 1933 Act that the Court
held could not be waived by Wilko's agreement to arbi·
trate find no counterpart in the 1934 Act. In particular,
the Court in Wilko noted that the jurisdictional provision
of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77v, allowed a plaintiff to
bring suit "in any court of competent jurisdictionfederal or state--and removal from a state court is pro·
hibited." 346 U. S.. at 431. The analogous provision
of the 1934 Act, by contrast, provides for suit only in the
federal district courts that have "exclusive jurisdiction,"
7 Section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77n,
provides as follows :
"Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person ac~
qmring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this
subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be·
void ."
Section 29 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C.
§ 78cc (a), provides :
"Any condition, stipulation or provision binding any person to
waive compliance w1th any prov1sion of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby
shall be void "
While the two sections are not identical, the variations in their wording seem trrelevant to the issue presented m this case,
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15 U.S. C. § 78aa, thus significantly restricting the plain;a
tiff's choice of forum.~
Accepting the premise, however, that the operative
portions of the language of the 1933 Act relied upon in
Wilko are contained in the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, the respondent's reliance on Wilko in this case
ignores the significant and, we find, crucial differences
between the agreement involved in Wilko and the one
signed by the parties here. Alberto-Culver's contract
to purchase the business entities belonging to Scherk was
a truly international agreement. Alberto-Culver is an
American corporation with its principal place of business
and the vast bulk of its activity in this country, while
Scherk is a citizen of Germany whose companies were
organized under the laws of Germany and Liechtenstein.
The negotiations leading to the signing of the contract
in Austria and to the closing in Switzerland took place
in the United States, England, and Germany, and
involved consultations with legal and trademark experts
from each of those countries and from Liechtenstein.
Finally, and most significantly, the subject matter of the
contract concerned the sale of business enterprises organized under the laws of and primarily situated in European countries, and whose activities were largely, if not
entirely, directed to European markets.
Such a contract involves considerations and policies
significantly different from those found controlling in
Wilko. In Wilko, quite apart from the arbitration pro..
" We do not reach, or imply any opunon a~ to the question
whrther thr acqui~ition of Srlwrk',; buo;inr~;;e:; wa>' a ~ecmity trans,
action within thE' mrnnmg of § 10 (b) and Rulr lOb-5 of the
Secuntif'ti Exchangr Act of 1934. Although tbi~ important. question
was con;;Idrred by t hr Di"trict Court and the Court of Appeals,
and altl.ough the di"~rnting opinion, post, ~erm;; to consider it
controlling, the petitimwr did not a~sign thr adver;;r ruling on the
que"tion a:; error and 11 wa~ not briefed or argurd in this Court ..

--G)
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vision, there was no question but that the laws of the
United States generally, and the federal s~curities laws
in particular, would govern disputes arising out of the
stock purchase agreement. The parties, the negotiations, and the subject matter of the contract were all
situated in this country, and no credible claim could have
been entertained that any international conflict of laws
problems would arise. In this case, by contrast, in the
absence of the arbitration provision considerable uncer..
tainty existed at the time of the agreement 1 and still
exists, concerning the law applicable to the resolution of
disputes arising out of the contract.u
Such uncertainty will almost inevitably exist with
respect to any contract touching two or more countries;
each with its own substantive laws and conflict of law
rules. A contractual provision specifying in advance tha
forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the law to
be applied is, therefore, an almost indispensable precon.dition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability
essential to any international business transaction. Furthermore, such a provision obviates the danger that ti
dispute under the agreement might be submitted to a
forum hostile to the interests of one of the parties or
unfamiliar with the problem area involved. 10
"Together vnth Its motion for a stay prndmg arbitration, Scher~
moved that the complaint be dismissed because the federal securities laws do not apply to this international transaction, cf. Leasca
Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F. 2d 1326 (CA2
1972) . Since only the order granting the injunction was appealed',
this contention was not considered by the Court of Appeals and is
not before this Court.
'" Sre Q\llglry, Acce::;::<ion b~· thr United State;; to the United Nation;; Convention on the Herognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, 70 Yair L. .J. 1049, 1051 (1961) . For example,
while the arbitration agrrenwnt involvrcl here provided that the
cont rover::;Il'S nri~ing out of the agreement be reo;olved under " [ t] he
law;; of thr State of IllinOJ,.;," supra, n. 1, a determination of the
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A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to
enforce an international arbitration agreement would
not only frustrate these purposes, but would invite
unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the
parties to secure tactical litigation advantages. In the
present case, for example, it is not inconceivable that if
Scherk had anticipated that Alberto-Culver would be
able in this country to enjoin resort to arbitration he
might have sought an order in France or some other
country enjoining Alberto-Culver from proceeding with
its litigation in the United States. Whatever recognition
the courts of this country might ultimately have granted
to the order of the foreign court, the dicey atmosphere of
such a legal no-man's-land would surely damage the
fabric of international commerce and trade, and imperil
the willingnes and ability of businessmen to enter into
international commercial agreements. 11
exi~tence

and extent of fraud concerning the trademarks would
mvolvr an 1mdC'rstanding of for0ign law on that subject.
11
The dissenting opinion ar!!;ues that our conclusion that Wilko
is inapplicabiC' to the ~ituation presented in this case will vitiate
tlw force of that drci:-;Iou bt>causC' parties to tran~actions with many
morE' direct contact:, w1th tlu:-; country than in the present case will
nonethrle::;::; be ablr to invoke the ''talisman" of having an " international contract." Post, at 8. ConcedE'dly, ~ituations may arise
when· thr contact:; w1th foreign countriE's arE' so insignificant or
attE'mmted that tlw holding m Wilko would mraningfully apply.
Judicial response to ::;uch situations can and should await future
litigation in concrPtC' ca::;e~. This cal:le, howevE'r, providrs no basis
for a Judgment that only United States laws and United States
courts ~hould detrnmnr tlm controver~y m the face of a solemn
agrrE'mrnt betwern the part!(';; that such controvrrsies be resolved
rl~ewhrrr. TllC.only contacts brtwec>n thE' United States and the
tranHaction mvolvrd here Is the fact. that Alberto-Culver is an
Amencan corporatiOn and the occurrence of some--but by no means
the grc>at,'r part-of the prrrontmct. negotiations in this country.
To determine that "American ~tandard<> of fairnE's ·," post, at 7,
must nonC'thelr;;s govern the controversy, or to imply that tl1e
necr~~aril)'
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The exception to the clear provisions of the Arbitration
Act carved out by Wilko is simply inapposite to a case
such as the one before us. In Wilko the Court reasoned
that "[w]hen the security buyer, prior to any violation
of the Securities Act, waives his right to sue in courts, he
gives up more than would a participant in other business
transactions. The security buyer has a wider choice of
courts and venue. He thus surrenders one of the advantages the Act gives him . . . ." 346 U. S., at 435. In the
context of an international contract, however, these
advantages become chimerical since, as indicated above,
an opposing party may by speedy resort to a foreign
court block or hinder access to the American court of the
purchaser's choice. D
Two Terms ago in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U. S. 1, we rej ected the doctrine that a forumselection clause of a contract, although voluntarily
adopted by the parties, will not be respected in a suit
brought in the United States "unless the selected state
would provide a more convenient forum than the state
in which suit is brought." !d., at 7. Rather, we concluded that a "forum clause should control absent a
strong showing that it should be set aside." /d., at 15.
We noted that "much uncertainty and possibly great
inconvenience to both parties could arise if a suit could
be maintained in any jurisdiction in which an accident
forum agrrrd upon wlil p rovidr " no remedy at all," post, a t 12,
clrm rans tht• ~tanda rd~ of ju;;ticr r lsewhr re in t he world , and unn rcr:;sarily Pxalts thr pnmac~· of Unit rd Stat es law over tlw laws
of ot hr r countne:>.
u The dis;;enting opinion rm;;r~ the ;;p rcter t hat our holding today
Will leavr Amrrican inve~tor~ at the mercy of m ul tinational corJlOmtionH wit h ''vast oprration;; around the world . . . . " Post,
a t. 12. Our drci::;wn, of cour~e, ha::; no bearin g on the scope of
thr substan t iw provi~ I on;; of thr fedrra l srcmities laws for the·
:-;1mplr rraHon that t hr qur:-;tion 1::; not prrsrn t~d m t his case. See
ll. /'<, SUIJI'O
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might occur or if jurisdiction were left to any place
[where personal or in rem jurisdiction might be established]. The elimination of all such uncertainties by
agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties
is an indispensable element in international trade, commerce, and contracting." I d., at 13-14.
An agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal
is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause
that posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute."l The invalidation of such an agreement in the case before us would
not only allow the respondent to repudiate his solemn
promise but would, as well, reflect a "parochial concept
that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in
our courts ... , We cannot have trade and commerce
in world markets and international waters exclusively on
our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our
courts. ld., at 9.1<
13

Under some cJrcmnstance;;, thP de::;ignation of arbitration in a
certain place might also be viewed as implicitly selecting the law of
that place to apply to that transaction. In this case, however, "[t]he
laws gf the State of Illinois" were explicitly made applicable by the
arbitration agreement. See n. 1, supra.
1
~ ln The Bremen we noted that. forum-selection clauses "should be
given full effect" when "a freely negotiated private international
agreement [is] unaffected by fraud .... " 407 U. S. 1, 12-13. This
qualification does not mean that any time a dispute arising out of
a transaction is based upon an allegation of fraud, as in this case, the
·clause is unenforceable. Rather, it means that an arbitration or
forum-selection clause in a contract is not enforceable if the inclusion
.of that clause in the contract was the product of fraud or coercion,
Compare Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
395.
Although we do not decidr the queJ:>tion , presumably the type of
fraud alleged herE' cou~d be rai~E' d , unc!E'r Art. V of the Convention
on the RPcognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
sre n. 12, infra, in challenging the enforcement of whatever arbitral
award is produced through :~rbitration. Article V (2) (b) of the
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For all these reasons we hold that the agreement of
the parties in this case to arbitrate any dispute arising
out of their internatibnal commercial transaction is to be
respected and enforced by the federal courts in accord
with the explicit provisions of the Arbitration Act. 10
Convention provide~ that a country may refus0 recognition and
enforcement of an award if "recognition or enforcement of the
award would be contrary to the public policy of that country. 11
15 Our conclusion today is confirmed by international developments and domestic legislation in the area of commercial arbitra ..
tion subsequent to the Wilko decision. On June 10, 1958, a special
conference of the Uhited Nations Economic and Social Council
adopted the Convention on the Reiloghitlon and Enforcement of
Forrign Arbitral Award~. In 1970 the United States acceded to
the treaty, [1970] 3 U. S. T . 2517 , T. I. A. S. No. 6997, and Congress passed Chapter 2 of the United States Arbitration Act, 9
U. S. C. §§ 201 ff., m order to implement the Convention. Section
1 of the new chapter provides unequivocally that the Convention
"shall be enforced in United States courts in accordance with this
chapter."
The goal of the Convention, and the principal purpose underlying
American adoption ahd implementation of it, was to encourage the
recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in
International contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in
the signatory countries. See Convention on the Recognition and En~
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, S. Exec. E. 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1968); Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, 70 Yale L. J. 1049 (1961) . Article II (1) of the
Convention provides:
"Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or
any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them
ln respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual
or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by
arbitration."
In their discussion of this Article, the delegates to the Convention
voiced frequent concern that courts of signatory countries in which
an agreement to arbitrate is sought to be enforced should not be per-
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Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered,

mitted to decline enforcement of such agreements on the basis of
parochial views of their desirability or in a manner that would
diminish the mutually binding nature of the agreements. See Haight,
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, Summary Analysis of Record of United Nations Conference
24-28 (1958) .
Without reaching the issue of whether the Convention, apart from
the considerations expressed in this opinion, would require of its
own force that the agreement to arbitrate be enforced in the present
case, we think that this country's adoption and ratification of the
Convention and the passage of Chapter 2 of the United States Arbitration Act provide strongly persuasive evidence of congressional
policy consistent with the decision we reach today.
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